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This research has largely shown that most Chinese workers are satisfied with their relationship with the Nigerian people while working abroad. It highlights key advantages of China-Nigeria relations that could be strengthened by both governments.
October 26th, 2023
What is the current state of China-Nigeria relations? How does government-level interplay between the two countries affect micro-level interactions among Chinese and Nigerian workers? What is the Nigerian public’s perception of China? Shuyang Jin discusses these issues in a summary of her research on Chinese workers in Nigeria as part of her University of Edinburgh MSc Dissertation Placement with Dataphyte.
Zeleza argues that the relationship between China and Africa has undergone three distinct periods, following the 1949 Chinese Revolution and the African decolonisation movement of the 1960s. The first period was a formative stage from the 1950s to the mid-1970s, during which China and individual African countries reaffirmed their individual national identities amidst a growing neo-liberal global movement. The second period, from the mid-1970s to the turn of the century, was a reconstruction period during which China and Africa both experienced significant political-economic reforms. The third period of the Sino-African relationship, according to Zeleza, is the current state of modern China-Africa relations, which has brought about extensive economic relations in the new century.
Both China and African states are involved in the newly emerging wave of multistakeholderism in the 21st century. According to Martyn Davis and others, it was the challenges and opportunities of this period that turned the Sino-African relationship into a more pragmatic form of economic cooperation, characterised by the frequent contact between Chinese and African stakeholders to develop an approach that is distinct from the traditional West-led aid strategies.
Many scholars believe that China has made significant progress as an all-round partner in Africa’s development aspirations in the 21st century. China’s relationship with African countries was originally purely economic, especially with Beijing’s “going out” strategy to support Chinese brands to expand their markets worldwide and to fuel the development of a more active Chinese foreign policy as a result.
In an examination of the China-Africa Community with Shared Benefits programme, Xiaoqing Ding and others argue that China’s going-out policy has over time been framed as a win-win, offering China an opportunity to share its development models with developing African countries, while African countries serve as equal partners for trade and other bilateral relations.
With China being the largest developing country globally and the African continent having the highest number of developing countries in the world, development is the primary task in this Sino-African relationship.
China aims that its capabilities in production and capital will boost relevant stakeholders’ growth and create a win–win situation. As Kevin Zhang noted in his study on China-Africa FDI relations, the notion of ‘South-South Cooperation’ has peculiar impacts on FDI-receiving African economies in terms of technology and sectoral distribution, in a way that is different from Global-North — Global-North and Global-North — Global-South FDI.
In this instance, China-led FDI in host countries is largely driven by the technological advantages of Chinese multinational enterprises. The massive potential of the latter’s productive sectors and similarity in terms of access to cheap labour make African countries more attractive to China. Manufacturing, mining, and construction industries are three African industrial sectors that have absorbed most China-led FDI, pointing to China’s advantage in labour-intensive industrial production.
Over the years, Chinese investment in Africa has become more outstanding and diverse. For instance, China-led FDI in Africa rose with breakneck speed from USD 490 million in 2003 to about 43.4 billion in 2021.
However, other scholars have argued that the role of China in Africa is that of a neo-colonial rogue donor. Some scholars describe this relationship as politically and economically asymmetrical, with China being better placed to benefit more from the relationship. As Huggan argued, this form of exploitation (neo-colonialism) is different from colonialism in terms of its characteristics of uneven global power relations and consistent racial oppression.
Essentially, neo-colonial domination creates a new form of imperialism through capitalism, globalisation, democracy, and trade liberalisation. Resultantly, these asymmetrical economic relations in the era of globalisation have ‘weakened’ African countries’ economic sovereignty. This forms the basis for similar criticisms of China-Africa relations, such as the ‘debt trap’. But how does all this play out in Nigeria? The next section examines this.
Nigeria is one of China’s biggest trade partners in Africa. Many believe that in its quest for industrialisation, the West African nation has taken advantage of China’s investment in its abundant natural resources for three reasons.
First, the dominant rentier nature of Nigeria’s economy, with crude oil as the main source of revenue and the US’s declining need for crude oil, drove China’s partnership with Nigerian governing elites.
Secondly, since Nigeria’s traditional development partners, such as the US and the UK place stronger emphasis on improving Nigeria’s social services over investing in capital-intensive projects, the visible infrastructure growth promoted by Chinese interest-free loans fit Nigerian demands more closely.
Thirdly, Nigeria was the first African country to allow China to develop Special Economic [trade] Zones (SEZs) after the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation in 2006. At the time, the Nigerian central government believed the Chinese manufacturing industry could create jobs and demonstrate economic potential in reducing dependence on exports of natural resources such as oil. As part of this partnership, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce required State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) to establish training centres in the SEZs to teach local technicians skills (Oyeranti et al., 2011, p190).
Nevertheless, Nigeria’s relationship with China is not always beneficial as it seems. With China’s massive loans in the country, the possibility for the Nigerian government to fall into a “debt trap” has threatened this relationship from the start.
Secondly, as China’s “going out” policy involves two types of Chinese enterprises, SOEs and Private-Owned Enterprises (POEs), SOEs tend to invest in resources and POEs prefer making investments in market and strategic assets. However, Chinese SOEs usually experience poor management and lack transparency, with bids lower than costs. In this situation, the lack of transparency of Chinese SOEs could worsen domestic corruption within the Nigerian government. For example, the security of the oil industry in the Niger Delta has been challenged by this governance issue as residents only received very little compensation from the large production of oil in this area. To express their displeasure, militias from the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) started to attack oil infrastructure and kidnap foreign oil workers in 2006, which worsened the relationship between China and Nigeria in terms of oil cooperation.
These critical assessments reveal the shortcomings of the current relationship between China and Nigeria at the government level. However, there is still a gap in our understanding of public perception of this relationship at the micro level. Even though there have been some studies on Nigerian citizens’ reactions to China’s involvement in their nation, the voice of Chinese overseas workers has usually been neglected by both policy and research.
A survey conducted with Chinese workers in Nigeria shows that 69.6% indicated that achieving personal dream (alongside other factors) was a consideration for choosing to work with Chinese companies in Nigeria, while 47.83 % noted high salary as one of the drivers of their choice to work in Nigeria (See Figure 1).
Scholars have argued that, for the average Chinese worker, the idea of ‘achieving personal dream’ is synonymous with social mobility. As such, the respondents who cited personal dreams and those who noted higher salaries as their reasons are both driven by economic considerations. Meanwhile, every Chinese overseas worker during the interviews mentioned that relatively higher incomes attracted them to work in Nigeria. “I became a father three months ago, and the wages offered by my job at home were too limited to feed my family”, a Chinese engineer at an SOE explained in the interview. The engineer had once worked in Nigeria, but returned home when he found a new job closer to his family after his marriage two years ago. However, his wife’s pregnancy precipitated his decision to return to Nigeria as there was a considerable income gap between a job at home and abroad in the same engineering position. A research by Chu and Hail has suggested that the correlation between income and subjective well-being is typically stronger at lower income levels. The universally high income has become China-led FDI’s most significant advantage in attracting workers of different nationalities.
Since there are two types of FDI companies in China, SOEs and POEs, the distinct characteristics of these two company types drove the comments from opposing sides. SOEs usually represent long-term jobs under government regulations but with restricted average wages. At the same time, profit-first POEs offered higher incomes, but the positions offered by the POEs were unstable.
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Figure 1: What motivates Chinese workers to work in Nigeria?
Similar to Chinese employees, a Nigerian engineer also emphasised that Nigerian workers found Chinese companies financially attractive. He compared his experience in Chinese and Nigerian companies in the energy sector, and concluded that his Chinese boss at an SOE was more generous than his Nigerian director in terms of financial remunerations. He observed that he could earn double his salary at a Nigerian company by working for a Chinese company based on his performance, including a seasonal bonus. This engineer has two sons at home, and a relatively high wage in the same profession adequately supplements the family income.
Chinese POEs offered even higher incomes than the SOEs, but the positions offered by the POEs were unstable. For instance, a Nigerian ordinary worker commented in the interview that, apart from regular monthly income, POEs provided welfare policies to improve their staff’s economic condition. The boss of this labourer’s POE imposed no upper or lower limits on bonuses, effectively alleviating his living burdens. Nevertheless, he also complained that most Chinese POEs came to Nigeria only to exploit the business potential of the large Nigerian market in a short time with no contribution to local sustainable development. Chinese POEs in Nigeria were driven by short-term interests, which caused instability in ordinary workers’ jobs.
From the cultural perspective, in the question asking whether Chinese workers are satisfied with their communication and cooperation with local people, 75 % of participants chose the answer “satisfied” (See Figure 2). However, among the remaining 25% of participants who were unsatisfied with their cooperation with Nigerian citizens, cultural factors such as limited education levels, differences in living habits, and language barriers were key factors.
Education was the greatest concern for Chinese participants when contacting their Nigerian colleagues and clients. Specifically, the language barriers created by some Chinese workers’ limited English skills often led to misunderstandings between the two groups of people.
Conversely, a limited understanding of the Chinese language on the part of Nigerian workers made communication more difficult, and this aroused feelings of grievance for ordinary Nigerian workers in POEs as they felt excluded from the decision-making processes of their companies. In the interview, a Nigerian worker complained that most Nigerian labourers were excluded from the core decision-making in Chinese companies. The dissimilar language and academic status prevented these labourers from accessing supervisory positions and learning new skills.
Learning Chinese has been a rising trend in Nigeria among local citizens looking to obtain jobs offering financial benefits and progressive technology in Chinese companies, and so far, China has founded at least two Confucian Institutes at the Nnamdi Azikiwe University (2008) and the University of Lagos (2009) for local people to learn about the Chinese language and culture. Both governments have agreed to set up cultural centres in each other’s countries to enhance cultural exchange and friendship, and by 2014, Nigeria was the first African country to build a cultural centre in China.
Remarkably, none of the Chinese workers in these surveys viewed feelings of being unwelcome or hostility from Nigerians as a factor (See Figure 3). The flexible working atmosphere and friendly integration at the workplace also encouraged more Chinese workers to stay in Nigeria longer.
Figure 2: The proportion of Chinese workers satisfied with their cooperation with local people.
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Figure 3: Reasons why Chinese people are unsatisfied with their cooperation with local people.
From the political perspective, the survey shows that more than 90% of Chinese workers believed their work in Nigeria had promoted local development (See Figure 4). However, the deep-rooted corruption within the Nigerian political system and the public innatism to view ‘the Chinese’ as a symbol of wealth increased difficulties for Chinese companies when launching projects in Nigeria. In the interviews, a Nigerian worker stated that the long-standing corruption has also ruined the connection between the government and the common people. Ordinary citizens tend not to trust the government’s decisions promoted through media and other conduits of information, which aroused a rebellious mind towards their government-led international cooperation with China. Some were indifferent to the changes in their life and remained neutral about any aid investment poured into Nigeria.
Figure 4: Chinese workers’ response to whether their work in Nigeria promoted local development or not.
From the security perspective, individual safety concerns are the most significant consideration for Chinese workers coming to Nigeria. In the in-person surveys of why Chinese workers avoid local after-work activities, 73.68% cited “safety concerns” as one of their considerations (See Figure 5).
People’s worry about personal security is also demonstrated in another question, which asked why people are unsatisfied with their work in Nigeria. A large number of respondents indicated “individual safety” in addition to other factors (See Figure 6). More specifically, the local perception that Chinese people are wealthy worsens the situation of Chinese citizens in Nigeria. A Nigerian driver of a Chinese director confirmed Chinese people’s concerns about individual safety during the interview. For example, on one occasion, while driving his boss home at night, the car had an accident and was forced to stop by an armed local militia. To protect themselves, his Chinese boss allowed him to give a large amount of Naira in cash to the militia, and they were safely released afterwards. These concerns have also amplified the uneven gender distribution of Chinese workers in Nigeria. A Chinese entrepreneur in the mining sector explains his rationale for not recruiting female workers in his company: “It is not about gender discrimination”, he stated. “Most pits are far away from the city and lack basic environmental hygiene. Sometimes, we also face some disputes with local tribes. Male workers have more capabilities to ensure their own safety in this situation”.
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Figure 5: Reasons Chinese people avoid participating in local activities.
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Figure 6: Reasons for Chinese workers’ dissatisfaction with their work in Nigeria.
This research has largely shown that most Chinese workers are satisfied with their relationship with the Nigerian people while working abroad. It highlights key advantages of China-Nigeria relations that could be strengthened by both governments. It also draws attention to the barriers hitherto neglected by policy-makers. Four recommendations are made.
In terms of economic cooperation, China has significantly contributed to infrastructure development and industrial growth in Nigeria. For a brighter prospect, SOEs and POEs should combine their individual positive characteristics in investment and recruitment to deliver sustainable development in local communities while maintaining their economic attraction to Chinese and Nigerian workers.
For cultural communication, eliminating language barriers is necessary to promote better collaboration among workers with different cultural backgrounds. It is important for Chinese companies to establish systematic language training for their Chinese employees before working abroad. Meanwhile, the Nigerian government could release a language exam to standardise foreigners’ English abilities while applying for a working visa.
For political improvements, although eradicating corruption is an urgent matter, this is a purely domestic affair, and as such, the Chinese government would do well to retain its commitment to non-interference in Africa’s politics. However, to limit the possibility of corrupt practices, Chinese SOEs and POEs need to establish some form of guardrails and ethical principles when working with Nigerian entities (e.g. ESG and socially-responsible investment frameworks).
For security concerns, it is not only the Chinese government and companies that should endeavour to protect Chinese workers’ safety, the Nigerian government needs to as well guarantee external labour forces’ rights while working in their country. Increasing personal safety will enhance confidence and attract more investment and human capital to Nigeria.
Finally, it is important that we take a critical approach to the dominant use of ‘neocolonialism’ to describe African nations’ sovereign actions at the international level. Often, such type of framing is without regard to actual local realities and public perception of the relationship. China’s engagement with Nigeria is still viewed as a strategic cooperation at both the macro and micro levels. Development is a long-term pursuit that requires multi-pronged efforts, and China seems positioned to aid, not hurt, Nigeria’s development efforts. Digging deeper into the opinions of the Nigerian masses will foster an improved China–Nigeria engagement.
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This research has largely shown that most Chinese workers are satisfied with their relationship with the Nigerian people while working abroad. It highlights key advantages of China-Nigeria relations that could be strengthened by both governments.
